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NOTES
more, mere knowledge of a material corporate development should
not preclude a broker from discussing with his client the overall
financial situation of a particular stock, as long as the specific
material fact is not divulged.
M
MILITARY RIGHTS UNDER THE FTCA
The Tort Claims Act was not an isolated
and spontaneous flash of congressional generosity.
It marks the culmination of a long effort to miti-
gate unjust consequences of sovereign immunity
from suit.'
The Federal Tort Claims Act 2 (hereinafter cited as FTCA)
"is indeed a sign of the times." 3 Its passage represents a funda-
mental departure from the medieval idea of sovereign immunity
and as such is consonant with the modern concept of a limited
and responsible sovereign. Judicial treatment of the Act, how-
ever, initially evinced a reluctance to give full effect to its broad
purpose. Invocation of the ancient maxim "[S]tatutes in deroga-
tion of the Common Law must be strictly construed" served to
rationalize the courts' refusal to accede to the full measure of
congressional reforms.4 While recently, judicial interpretation and
application have been generally progressive, a degree of circum-
vention still remains. Demonstrative of the courts current refusal
to accept repudiation of immunity at face value are those cases
involving the rights of military personnel under the Act. While
a literal reading of the Act gives no indication of a congressional
intent to exclude servicemen, courts, pragmatically reasoning that
the literal meaning may be broader than that intended, have read
I Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950).
260 Stat. 842 (1946). The Act is now codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291,
1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2410-12, 2671-80 (1964). Jurisdiction is vested ex-
clusively in federal courts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
3 Pound, The Federal Tort Clains Act: Reason or History?, 30
NACCA L.J. 404, 406 (1964).
4 .g, Long v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 35, 37 (S.D. Cal. 1948);
Spelar v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 967, 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1948).
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an additional exception into the Act 5 through a questionable inter-
pretation of its framer's intent.6
Although the common-law political theory that the King
could do no wrong was repudiated in America, its legal corollary
that the sovereign is immune from suit was invoked on behalf of
the infant Republic and preserved inviolate until relatively recent
times.7  Prior to the adoption of the FTCA, the general relin-
quishments of sovereign immunity were few in number and
circumspect in scope. Permission to sue was granted only on
contract,3 patent infringement, 9 admiralty and marine tort,10 and
torts by public vessels.1" Alternatively, no action could be main-
tained against the government with respect to any common-law
tort. Relief was sought by the introduction of private bills in
Congress, a system criticized as being both unduly burdensome and
unjust as it "[did] not accord to injured parties a recovery as a
matter of right but base[d] any award that may [have been]
made on considerations of grace."' 2  Furthermore, the system
providing for private relief afforded no "well-defined continually
operating machinery for the consideration of such claims." 13
These intrinsic inadequacies were intensified by the rapidly altering
concept of sovereignty. As the government increasingly under-
5Jefferson v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 706, 711-12 (D. Md. 1948).
This reasoning has been repeatedly invoked by courts confronted with
the problem of servicemen's claims under the Act. For echoes of such
reasoning see Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950); United
States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840, 842 (4th Cir. 1948), ree'd, 337 U.S. 49
(1949).
6Earlier commentators saw little merit in the federal judiciary's
exclusion of certain military claims arguing that the history and structure
of the Act warranted recovery for all claims not expressly excluded.
See, e.g., Hitch, The Federal Tort Claims Act and Military Personnel,
8 RuTGERs L. REv. 316 (1954); Comment, Federal Tort Claims Act As
Applied To Military Personnel, 40 Ky. L.J. 438, 444 (1952).
7Gibbons v. United States, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 269 (1868); Cohens
v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264 (1821); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S.
(2 Dall.) 419 (1793). Dean Prosser questions "how this feudal and
monarchistic doctrine ever got itself translated into the law of the new and
belligerently democratic republic. . . ." W. PRossER, THE LAw OF TORTS
§ 125 (3d ed. 1964). Mr. Justice Holmes took a practical view, noting:
A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal con-
ception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground
that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes
the law on which the right depends. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205
U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
s28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2) (1964).
9 36 Stat. 851 (1910), as amnended, 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1964).
10 Surrs IN ADMIRALITY Acr, 41 Stat. 525 (1920), as amended, 46 U.S.C.
§§741-52 (1964).
11 Puauc VEssELs ACT, 43 Stat. 1112 (1925), as amended, 46 U.S.C.
§§781-90 (1964).
12 S. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1946).
is Id.
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took to conduct many of the services which had hitherto been
maintained by private enterprise, its agents committed an ever-
increasing number of remediless wrongs. And, as governmental
activity increased, the pressure upon Congress to enact private
bills multiplied to such an extent as to impede the ordinary and
proper function of the legislature . 4  Recognition of the inadequacy
of congressional machinery to deal with this problem engendered
demands that tort claims be submitted to adjudication.
After a generation of effort involving some twenty abortive
bills,'5 Congress ultimately adopted the FTCA which in rather
sweeping language abolished the archaic and often cumbersome
system of legislative determination. Jurisdiction is conferred upon
district courts over civil actions or claims against the United
States for injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee
of the government . . . under circumstances where the United States,
if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with
the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.'8
Enacted as an integral part of the Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1946,17 the legislative context of the Act reveals a dual
purpose: to remove the previous barrier against suits sounding in
tort against the federal government and also to relieve Congress
of the burden of dealing with the voluminous amount of private
bills for relief, which were, absent any other remedy, submitted
annually."' So enacted, the statute has become a prolific source
of litigation-its not altogether ambiguous language presenting
novel problems of construction and application.
The rights of the military under the Act typifies this difficulty
of application. Concerning the exceptions to the FTCA, none
have proved more litigious, nor more difficult to rationalize than
the judicially imposed bar to suits by members of the armed
forces for "injuries sustained incident to service." Of the
thirteen enumerated exceptions to the general waiver of liability, 9
4Id. at 7. See also United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840 (4th Cir.
1948).
'5 Eighteen of these bills were considered in the decade 1925-1935. These
bills are collected in Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 51 n.2
(1949).
2628 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964).
1760 Stat. 842 (1946). The general purpose of the LEGISLATIV
REORGANiZATioN ACT was "to reconvert our inherited and outmoded con-
gressional machinery to the needs of today." S. REP,. No. 1400, 79th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2 (1946). Significantly "[b]y revising our antiquated rules and
improving our facilities, we can . . . revitalize our National Legislature
and renew popular faith in American democracy." Id. at 9.
'
8 See United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 154 (1963).
20 28 U.S.C § 2680 (1964).
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only two could be said to affect the rights of military personnel:
that which prohibits recovery upon all claims "arising out of the
combatant activities of the military, during the time of war" ;20
and that Which excludes liability upon "any claim arising in a
foreign country," 21 neither of which have been held apposite to
the present problem.22
An examination of the record fails to produce any clear
evidence of congressional intent or policy which could guide one
toward a proper interpretation of the Act. 23 Prior to its enact-
ment, eighteen bills directed toward waiving governmental
immunity from general tort liability were introduced into Congress.
Of these, all but two contained exceptions denying recovery to the
military. When the present Act was first introduced, the excep-
tions relating to servicemen had been dropped. Remaining from
prior bills was an exclusion of those claims compensable under
the World War Veterans Act of 1924. However, upon incor-
poration into the Legislative Reorganization Act, all remnants
of the military exclusion disappeared. Unfortunately, there is no
explanation to be found in the legislative history of the Act con-
cerning this sudden disappearance. It has been suggested, how-
ever, that Congress had considered and rejected the exclusion of
servicemen from the benefits of the Act.24 Such an inference is
further supported by the fact that section 2680(j) of the Act as
originally enacted excluded any claim arising out of the "activities"
of the military. By way of amendment during debate in the House,
the provision was further limited to exclude only those claims
arising out of "combatant activities." 25
Two considerations, however, militate against any such facile
determination of the legislative intent. The Act must be read in
view of the central purpose of the legislation - "to provide for
2028 U.S.C. §2680(j) (1964).
2128 U.S.C. §2680(k) (1964).22 These exceptions have been held to relate to the circumstances under
which the injury occurs, rather than the status of the injured party. The
exception thus applies to claims of soldiers and civilians alike. See, e.g.,
United States v. Brooks, 169 F2d 840, 844 (4th Cir. 1948) wherein the
court states "the . . . exception is couched solely in terms of the source of
the activity giving rise to the claim . . . regardless of the claimant".
23 Most of the pertinent legislative opinion and debate relating to the
Act is recorded in H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1946);
S. Rm. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946); and 86 CONG. Rrc.
12015-32 (1940). None of these include any discussion of the present
problem. See also Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 138, wherein the
Court, in recognizing the paucity of guiding materials, observes that under
such circumstances "no conclusion can be above challenge."
24This argument was urged in the dissenting opinion of Brooks,
169 F.2d 840, 849 (4th Cir. 1948).25 The "combatant" qualification was added, without recorded ex-
planation, by House amendment during final passage. See 92 CoNG. RE(.
10139, 10150 (1946). But see supra note 22.
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increased efficiency in the legislative branch of the government" ;26
secondly, the Act should be construed to fit as intelligently and as
fairly as possible "into the entire statutory system of remedies
against the Government to make a workable, consistent and equi-
table whole." 27 Under such circumstances, one is hesitant in
reaching any definite conclusion regarding congressional intent.
THE INCIDENT TO SERVICE RULE: A JUDIcIALLY
CREATED EXCEPTION
The Supreme Court has addressed itself to this problem at
some length. In the first case to reach the Court under the Act,
Brooks v. United States, 8 the Court considered claims arising from
the death and personal injuries sustained by two servicemen, while
on furlough, resulting from the collision of their vehicle with an
Army truck. The Court held that the benefits of the Act were
available to servicemen injured or killed while in service, despite
prior recovery pursuant to military compensation laws.
The statute's terms are clear. They provide for District Court juris-
diction over any claim founded on negligence brought against the
United States. We are not persuaded that 'any claim' means 'any
claim but that of servicemen.' 29
The Court observed that in addition to the very language and
structure of the FTCA, its legislative history compelled this result.
The Court noted that the Act, passed amid mass demobilization,
expressly excluded injuries in a foreign country or those arising
out of the combatant activities of the armed forces; that most of
the tort claims bills previously before Congress had contained no
provisions excluding all servicemen from recovery; and, that the
exception disallowing claims by those entitled to recover pursuant
to the World War Veteran's Act of 1924 was deleted from the
bill on passage. Relating to the existence of compensation statutes
providing for servicemen injured while in service, the Court found,
26S. REP,. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1946). Insofar as the
bills introduced into Congress for the relief of servicemen were "exceedingly
rare," it has been argued that military claims were beyond the express pur-
pose of the Act, thus remaining subject to their prior restrictions. Feres
v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 (1950); United States v. Brooks, 169
F.2d 840, 842 (4th Cir. 1948). But see United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S.
150, 154 (1963).
27 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950).
28337 U.S. 49 (1949). It is to be noted that the Brooks Court con-
sidered only the limited question of whether members of the armed forces
could recover under the FTCA for injuries not incident to their service.
Id. at 50.
29 Id. at 51.
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unlike the usual workmen's compensation statute, no indication of
an intent to forbid'actions under the FTCA.
We will not call either remedy in the present case exclusive, nor
pronounce a doctrine of election of remedies, when Congress has not
done so.30
But this did not imply that the amount recovered pursuant to
servicemen's benefit laws was non-deductible. Accordingly, the
Court reduced judgment to the extent that the claimant had been
compensated.
The rationale employed by the Brooks Court would seem to
warrant a similar result in cases involving service-incident injuries.
The Court, it should be noted, emphasized only those factors sup-
portive of a congressional intent to include all servicemen, thereby
precluding the existence of an implied exception to servicemen's
suits under the FTCA, regardless of the nature of the injury.
However, the Court's express reservation of opinion as to the
"wholly different case" of injuries sustained incident to active
service would seem to militate against such a conclusion. The
practical results of allowing recovery in such cases might neces-
sitate a different finding of congressional intent.3 '
The "wholly different case" reserved from opinion in Brooks
soon presented itself to the Supreme Court in Feres v. United
States.-2 Feres was the consolidation of three cases,33 the common
30Id. at 53.
31 Apparently the Court in Brooks recognized the futility of limiting itself
to consideration of the Act's legislative history. Indeed, the Court seems
swayed by more practical considerations in imputing any intent to Congress.
Thus it held:
Interpretation of the same words may vary, of course, with the
consequences, for those consequences may provide insight for de-
termination of congressional purpose. . . . The Government's fears
may have point in reflecting congressional purpose to leave injuries
incident to service where they were, despite literal language and
other considerations to the contrary. The redt may be so outlandish
that even the factors we have mentioned would not permit recovery.
Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 52-53 (1949) (emphasis added).
This reasoning may surely be characterized as "practical" and curiously
anticipates subsequent Supreme Court decisions.
32340 U.S. 135 (1950).
33 Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1949), aff'd, 340 U.S.
135 (1950), wherein the Second Circuit denied recovery under the Act in a
case concerning the death of an army lieutenant who perished in a barracks
fire, when it was known or should have been known that the heating plant
was defective. Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949),
aff'd sub nom., Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), involved
medical malpractice wherein the court of appeals had denied recovery stating
that a soldier on active duty could not sue pursuant to FTCA for
injuries caused by the negligence of army doctors in failing to remove
a thirty-inch towel from his stomaeh. Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d
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element being that "each claimant, while on active duty and not on
furlough, sustained injury due to negligence of others in the armed
forces." 34 Adopting the pragmatic reasoning implicit in. Brooks,
i.e., that the practical results of allowing recovery in cases involving
injuries sustained incident to service might require a different find-
ing of congressional intent, the Feres Court denied recovery.
Recognizing that the primary purpose of the Act was to extend
a remedy to those formerly without, the Court asserted that as
Congress had been burdened with no deluge of private bills on
behalf of the military, recovery for injuries incident to service
would seem beyond the scope of the Act. Turning to an examina-
tion of existing remedies, it observed that Congress through a
series of enactments had provided a system of "simple, certain, and
uniform compensation for injuries or death of those in armed
services." 3' Thus, absent any provision in the FTCA for adjust-
ment, the Court refused to impute to Congress an intent to confer
additional benefits on servicemen.
In considering the test of allowable claims under the Act,
an important factor was the lack of analogous liability in the private
sector. Emphasizing the severity of the break with tradition if
these claims were allowed, the Court noted that the effect of the
FTCA is "to waive immunity from recognized causes of action
. . . not to visit the Government with novel and unprecedented
liability." "
Lacking the guidance of any explicit statement of congressional
intent relevant to this problem, the Court observed the effect of
the "distinctly federal" relationship existing between the govern-
ment and members of its armed forces upon service-incident claims.
Inasmuch as such a relationship has traditionally been governed
exclusively by federal authority, the fact that no federal law had
1 (10th Cir. 1949), rez/d sub. twm., Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135(1950) wherein the appellate court had held a complaint alleging the
negligence of army doctors in the wrongful death of decedent to have
stated a cause of action under the Act.34340 U.S. at 138.351d. at 144. Indeed, the Court found these military compensation
systems to be neither negligible nor niggardly. Servicemen have tradition-
ally been provided with a compensation system. Benefits for servicemen and
veterans appear in 10 U.S.C. §§ 1201-12 (1964) and 38 U.S.C. §§314-15,
334-35 (1964). This compensation system affords death benefits, 10 U.S.C.§ 1475 et seq., and survivor benefits to dependents, 38 U.S.C. § 401 et seq.,
both available as of right. Furthermore, if injuries are serious enough
to require discharge, a system of disability benefits are also available as a
matter of right under certain circumstances. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 1201 et seq.,
1401 et seq., (1964); see 'also 38 U.S.C. §331 et seq., (1964). For a
comprehensive treatment of benefits available under the compensation system
see Comment, Torts-Rights of Servicemen Under Federal Torts Claim
Act, 45 N.C.L Rzv. 1129, 1138-40 (1967). See also Note, Military
Personnel and Military Medical Negligence, 49 MAQ. L. REv. 610, (1966).
30340 U.S. at 142.
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recognized recovery under such circumstances was held preclusive
of liability. Similarly, the Court found it significant that the
FTCA made applicable "the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred." 37 In its opinion, it would be irrational to
predicate recovery upon geographic considerations over which serv-
icemen had no control. In conclusion, the Court distinguished
Brooks on the basis that the injury therein did not arise out of or
in the course of military duty.
THE Fmms RATIONALE
The Feres Court, groping to discern an implied congressional
intent to exclude governmental liability for service-connected in-
juries, premised its decision upon those considerations which in its
collective judgment seemed persuasive of such an intent. Recent
Supreme Court developments, however, paralleled a growing doubt
among the lower federal courts as to the continued viability of these
factors, have resulted in minor tremors in the application of the
"incident to service rule." The innovations and turmoil presently
characteristic of the area assume broader significance as they are
illustrative of a gradual liberalization of judicial attitudes which
render consideration of this narrow but extremely important sub-
ject timely.-
The Governmental -Private Liability Analogy
The reasoning of Feres which limited governmental liability to
those situations where there existed analogous private liability has
been subsequently abandoned by the Supreme Court.39 The initial
step was taken in Indian Towing Co. v. United States,40 a suit
under the FTCA for injury to a tug and cargo barge allegedly
caused by the negligence of the Coast Guard in the maintenance of
a lighthouse. The Government, relying upon Feres, contended that
the Act should be held to exclude liability in the performance of
activities which private persons do not perform. The Court, how-
ever, observed that it is well-settled in the law of torts that "one
3728 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964).
38 See Caruso, An Analysis Of The Evolution Of The Supreme Court's
Concept Of The Federal Tort Claims Act, 26 FED. B.J. 35-45 (1966).
The author concludes that two forces account for the liberalization of the
Supreme Court's attitude toward the Act:
These two forces were changes in the Court's membership and a shift
from a narrow view to a broader view on the part of some members
of the Court. Id. at 45.
39See Comment, Federal Tort Claims Act As Applied To Military Per-
sonnel, 40 Ky. L.J. 43, 441 (1952) which considers the Court's argument
that individuals do not maintain an army as frivolous.
40350 U.S. 61 (1955).
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who undertakes to warn the public of danger and thereby induces
reliance must perform his 'good Samaritan' task in a careful man-
er." The Court saw the government as reading:
the statute as imposing liability in the same manner as if it were a
municipal corporation and not as if it were a private person, and it
would thus push the courts into the 'non-governmental'-'governmental'
quagmire that has long plagued the law of municipal corporations ...
The fact of the matter is that the theory whereby municipalities are
made amenable to liability is an endeavor . . . to escape from the basic
historical doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Federal Tort Claims
Act cuts the ground from under that doctrine; it is not self-defeating
by covertly embedding the casuistries of municipal liability for tort.42
Indian Towing was, therefore, a cautious first-step toward the
imposition of broader liability upon the United States. In Rayonier,
Inc. v. United States,43 the Supreme Court abandoned this mod-
erate language and held the Government liable under the FTCA
for the negligence of the Forest Service in fighting a forest fire.
The Court observed:
It may be that it is 'novel and unprecedented' to hold the United
States accountable for the negligence of its firefighters, but the very
purpose of the Tort Claims Act was to waive the Government's tradi-
tional all-encompassing immunity from tort actions and to establish
'novel and unprecedented' governmental liability."
Indian Towing and Rayonier thus establish that governmental lia-
bility is no longer restricted to those circumstances in which govern-
ment bodies have been traditionally responsible for the misconduct
of their employees. This transition from "similar activity" to
"similar negligence," 45 insofar as it has extended the Act to "novel
and unprecedented" forms of liability, may be said to have under-
mined the persuasiveness of the analogous liability rationale of
Feres.
The Availability of Other Compensation
In denying liability, Feres accorded considerable weight to
the existence of various military compensation laws. However,
the Court's decisions both prior and subsequent to Feres have been
41 Id. at 64-65.
41Id. at 65.
43353 U.S. 352 (1957).
44Id. at 319.
45 See Comment, Sovereign Imniiy-Federal Tort Claims Act--
Injuries To Armed Services Pesonnel, 18 W. REs. L. Rtv. 1788, 1793,
(1967).
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held lacking in any precise consistency as to the effect of such
systems. 46  In United States v. Brooks47 neither the availability
nor prior recovery of statutory benefits was held preclusive of
recovery by a serviceman. Instead, the compensation award was
applied in mitigation of the damages recovered pursuant to judg-
ment. Also, in United States v. Brown,48 the Court, in allowing
a veteran to recover for post-discharge injuries sustained in a Vet-
eran's hospital, reaffirmed the position taken in Brooks.
Congress could, of course, make the compensation system the exclusive
remedy .... We noted in the Brooks case that Congress had given no
indication that it made the right to compensation the veteran's exclusive
remedy . . . and did not preclude recovery . . . but only reduced the
amount of any judgment. . . . We adhere to that result 49
More recent holdings of the Supreme Court, involving prison-
ers' rights under the FTCA, have interjected greater confusion as
to the effect of such compensation statutes. In United States v.
Muniz,5° the Court held suits by federal prisoners to be within the
purview of the FTCA. Finding no congressional intent to exclude
such claims it reasoned that "the presence of a compensation sys-
tem persuasive in Feres, does not of necessity preclude a suit for
negligence." 51 Citing Brown, the Court implicitly recognized that
the mere presence of a compensation system is not preclusive of
liability under the Act. Quite to the contrary, however, subsequent
cases have distinguished between the mere presence and actual
availability of such statutory benefits. While .Auniz found no con-
gressional intent to deny federal prisoners relief under the Act, it
- Lee v. United States, 261 F. Supp. 252 (C.D. Cal. 1966). See also
Comment, supra note 45, at 1792; Comment, Torts-Rights of Servicemen
Under Federal Torts Claim Act, 45 N.C.L. Rv. 1129, 1134-35 (1967).
47337 U.S. 49 (1949).
48348 U.S. 110 (1954).
49Id. at 113.50374 U.S. 150 (1963). Muniz involved a federal prisoner's right to
sue under the FTCA for personal injuries sustained during confinement in
a federal prison, resulting from' the negligence of a government employee.
The Court in reasoning a cause of action might lie adopted an approach
strikingly similar to that of Feres. Of controlling importance in allowing
recovery was the unavailability of compensation benefits to claimant. The
predecessor of 18 U.S.C. §4126 (1964) extended benefits only to prisoners
working for Federal Prison Industries, Inc. out of which only twenty
percent of all prisoners were so employed. 374 US. at 160 ni17. This
coverage has been subsequently expanded to include "any work activity
in connection with the maintenance or operation of the institution where
confined." 18 U.S.C. §4126 (1964). For a comprehensive treatment of
developments in this analogous area of 'federal prisoners' rights under the
FTCA see Woody, Recovery by Federal Prisoners Under The Federal
Tort Claims.Act, 36 WAsH. L. Rv. 338 (1961).
51374 U.S. at 160.
[ VOL. 43
NOTES
has been subsequently noted that nothing in the legislative history
of the FTCA is indicative of a purpose to provide additional recov-
ery under the Act for those prisoners already benefitted under a
statutory compensation system. Indeed, in United States v.
Demko,5 2 the Supreme Court has recently upheld its Feres rationale
relating to the exclusivity of a comprehensive system of compensa-
tion. The Court, in denying a federal prisoner relief under the
Act, reasoned that
where there is a compensation statute that reasonably and fairly
covers a particular group of workers, it presumably is the exclusive
remedy to protect that group.5 3
Relying upon Johansen v. United States, 4 the Court contended
that in view of the creation of a comprehensive system of com-
pensation, Congress should not be held to have made exceptions
thereto absent specific legislation to that effect.
While the foregoing results seem inconsistent, it should be
noted that each case turns upon certain "distinguishing factors."
Thus, assuming a congressional policy precluding liability for
injuries sustained incident to service, Brooks and Brown are con-
sistent with Feres insofar as recovery in the former was sought
for non-service incident injuries. In addition, these "factual dis-
tinctions" serve to reconcile the seemingly inconsistent results of
Muniz and Demko as the latter was not afforded the statutory
benefits while the former came within the purview of such protec-
tion. Significantly, the vigour of the Court's recent affirmation of
the exclusivity rationale would seem broader than its initial ex-
pression. Indeed, unlike Feres, Demko abstained from the prag-
matic approach, adopting instead, as sole criterion, the availability
of statutory benefits. Such would seem to be an abandonment of
the Brooks position.55
52385 U.S. 149 (1966).
53 d. at 152.
r4343 U.S. 427 (1952).
5The rationale underlying Demko strongly suggests such an influence.
Preclusion from the benefits of the Act in the Brooks, Feres, Browm tril-
ogy has been conditioned upon the co-existence of two factors: 1) an
implied exception to recovery under the FTCA premised upon various
practical considerations; and 2) the availability of statutory benefits pur-
suant to a comprehensive compensation act. Demko, however, has dis-
regarded the first consideration and relied solely upon the availability factor.
This observation, however, is subject to strong reservations. As yet,
there has been no statutory provision declaring servicemen's compensation
laws exclusive, as under the FE~mA. EmnLoY-s COMPEnsATION AcT.
Similarly, while this is also true of federal prisoner compensation laws,
the Court's treatment in Demko seems to compel the inference that these
laws are substantially workmen's compensation laws. Unlike the statutory
systems available for servicemen, such an analogy would seem well-founded.
1969 ]
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While the effect of compensation is certain, the Court's
reasoning gives rise to certain logical dfficulties. Thus, the
Court in Feres analogized to certain workmen's compensation
statutes.5 6  That the analogy is hardly satisfactory is apparent in
that: 1) the serviceman is without the power to terminate his
status at will; and 2) military service is more often of a compulsory
rather than an elective nature.
Furthermore, the Court has distinguished Feres from Brooks
by applying the test of whether the injury was sustained "incident
to service." This distinction seems inconsistent with Veterans
Administration's interpretation of the laws as applied to injuries
or death suffered by servicemen during military service.57 Statu-
tory benefits are available to servicemen whether or not they are
within the narrow ambit of Feres. Veterans Administration regu-
lations provide, in effect, that any injury or disease incurred by a
member of the armed forces while in active duty status will be
deemed to have been incurred in the line of duty, provided it is
not the result of his own willful misconduct. 58 The situation thus
arises whereby the serviceman injured in the performance of actual
military duty has the limited recourse of compensation benefits
while the serviceman injured on furlough is accorded both the
statutory and judicial remedy. The result, therefore, is predicated
upon the view that the FTCA precludes such recovery and not on
the concept that statutory benefits afford the exclusive remedy.59
This incongruity is only partially mitigated by the set-off require-
ments of Brooks. If these statutory benefits were intended to pro-
vide exclusive relief for those injuries sustained incident to service,
expansion and equalization seem to be in order. The claimant
should be entitled to recover all damages allowable under a private
suit.
See United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149, 151-52 (1966). See also Com-
ment, supra note 52, at 1792 n.38 wherein the author recognizes that Demko
relied upon the reasoning of Johansen v. United States, 343 U.S. 427 (1952)
in holding the available compensation statute exclusive.
56340 U.S. at 145.
57 Traditionally, "time of duty" has been employed to define a status
which ascertains possible compensation regardless of whether or not the
individual was at the time of injury on furlough, leave or even under
arrest. See 36 GEo. L.J. 276, 277 (1948).
58E.g., Am FORCE REGULATION (AFR) 35-67 sets forth how and
when a "line of duty" determination is to be made. Thus, all findings are
"in line of duty" unless the injury or disease resulted from the person's
own misconduct, occurred during desertion or while absent without author-
ity, or existed prior to service.
59 While in both instances the practical result is the same, the theoretical
difference is the Achilles heel of the co-existence of remedies. See Hitch,
The Federal Tort Claims Act and Military Persomtel, 8 RuTGEs L. REv.
316 (1954); Note, Federal Liability to Personnel of the Arned Forces, 20
GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 90 (1951).
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THE "DISTINCTLY FEDERAL'" RELATIONSHIP AND THE
APPLICATION OF STATE LAW
Also underlying the Court's decision in Feres is the notion
that the "distinctly federal" character of the relation subsisting
between the government and the military should bar "incident to
service" claims under the Act. It is submitted that the general
relationship provides no decisive answer. In Brooks, the Court
had no difficulty in allowing recovery, despite the presence of the
"distinctly federal" relationship.60 Such results seem incongruous.
To be sure, a soldier is at all times subject to military law and
discipline.6 ' On the other hand, he is still a citizen and, generally,
his military status does not relieve him of the rights and duties
incident thereto. Furthermore, as the military has in modern times
assumed the aura of a citizen's army, maintained by a system of
universal conscription, there seems less reason today for discrim-
inating against the soldier, except in those peculiarly military
aspects of his life.
Feres also based denial of recovery upon the illogic of subject-
ing the military claimant to the vicissitudes of state law. In this
respect it is significant to note the Court's statement in Munis that
"[it nonetheless seems clear that no recovery would prejudice
them even more." 62 Recognizing that Muniz is distinguishable
from those cases involving military rights under the Act, as recov-
ery was the only alternative, the statement, nevertheless, detracts
from the Court's reasoning in Feres. In treating the effect of
variations of state laws, the Court in Feres conveniently disregarded
the impact of military compensation laws. In view of the co-
existence of the statutory and judicial remedies, as an alternative
to denial of relief the injured soldier could be put to an election of
remedies; or consonant with Brooks, those compensation benefits
received could be set off in mitigation of damages received pursuant
to the FTCA. This more generous approach would not prejudice
the soldier-the basic argument of the Court in Feres-but would,
instead, place him in a preferred position.
Secondly, in view of the recent innovations in conflicts of law,
the validity of predicating relief upon the outdated notion of lex
loci delictus would seem suspect. This traditional rule itself has
6 For the original exposition of this argument, see Jefferson v. United
States, 77 F. Supp. 706, 713 (D. Md. 1948). Support for the proposition
was a statement in United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305
(1947). The case involved the problem of whether the government could
be subrogated to a soldier's claim against the company for hospital treat-
ment. The proposition would thus seem to be inapposite to the immediate
problem.
61 Hitch, The Federal Tort Claims Act and Military Personmel, 8 RUTGERS
L. REv. 316, 324 (1954).
62United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 162 (1963).
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been severely criticized for its characteristically harsh results.63
And, by its abandonment, there appears little reason for immunizing
the claimant from state law. 64
In General.
In rejecting the plain language of the FTCA, the Supreme
Court appears to have been influenced by what it considered sound
policy. Given the logical inconsistencies which abound in Feres,
one, however, wonders how convinced the Court is of its own
reasoning. The Court in imputing to Congress an intent to exclude
service-incident claims appears to be engaging in fictions for no
apparent reason. Caught in the quagmire of judicial sophistry
one gropes for firmer ground. In retrospect the Court has offered
such an alternative. While the opinion in United States v. Munia 65
expressly stated that the Court found no reason to question Feres
as it related to military claims, it, nevertheless, was expressive of
an obvious paucity of ardour for each of the reasons upon which
the case was founded. 66 In the course of the opinion, Chief Justice
Warren, citing Brown, offered this explanation of Feres:
In the last analysis, Feres seems best explained by the 'peculiar and
special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the effects of the
maintenance of such suits, on discipline, and the extreme results that
might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims Act were allowed for
negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of
military duty. ... , 67
Here is no search for an implied congressional intent founded
upon tenuous policy considerations as attempted by Feres but
rather, an explicit recognition of the policy basic to both Feres and
Brown.
63 R.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S2d
743 (1963).
64 Considering the legislative context of the FTCA, the Court asserted
that prior to the Act's passage private bills were frequently sought by
civilians, but only rarely by soldiers, and inferred from this state of
affairs a congressional intent to withhold from servicemen the remedies
of the Act. So reasoning, the Court seems to have overlooked the other
facet of the Act-its sweeping waiver of immunity to actions in tort. The
Court has more recently recognized that though cognate to the object of
abolishing private bills, the waiver of immunity also has this independent
value.
65374 U.S. 150 (1963).
66See Lee v. United States, 261 F. Supp. 254, 256 (1966).
67 374 U.S. at 162.
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AN EVALUATION oF THIs STATUTORY AND COURT-MADE
EXEMPTION
While Congress sought to waive governmental immunity, it
was not contemplated that the government should be subject to
liability arising from all acts governmental in nature.6 There are,
of course, those activities which by their very nature should be free
from the hindrance of possible suit. There are valid reasons for
the FTCA's exclusion of civilian and military claims arising out of
wartime combat. By the very nature of war and its incident
activity, the military cannot be held to any ordinary standard of
care. Moreover, the citizen's obligation to bear arms would neces-
sarily imply certain risks and hardships of a non-justiciable nature.69
But accepting the proposition that this waiver was intended to be
practical as well as theoretical, there exists the difficulty as to
penumbral rights under the Act, i.e., when and where should the
government be held liable for the tortious conduct of its agents.
Deeming the "time of war" limitation too narrow, the Supreme
Court has expounded a theory of an implied exception to the FTCA
which precludes recovery by the military for injuries sustained
"incident to service." As one commentator has poignantly observed,
it is interesting . . . that the Court has adopted such a vague and
meaningless standard . . . even though [it] . . . had previously con-
demned the same language as 'deceptively simple and litigiously prolific'
in a Workmen's Compensation case dealing with the problem of whether
or not a claimant's injury arose out of and in the course of his
employment.
70
OS See, e.g., Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141 (1950); Brooks
v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 53 (1949). For an analysis of the FTCA,
see Gelihorn and Schenck, Tort Actions Against the Federal Government,
47 CoLo. L. REv. 722 (1947).
09Note, Military Personnel and The Federal Tort Claims Act, 58
YALE L.J. 615, 626 (1949). This is not to imply that the tort doctrine of
"assumption of risk" is applicable to claims of the military under the Act.
The conscriptive nature of the armed forces, of course, would negate the
presence of the requisite "voluntariness." See also Note, Recovery for
"Service-Incident" Injuries Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 50 CoLo.
L. REv. 827, 831 (1950).
7019 GA. BJ. 381 (1957). It is significant to note that the service-
incident concept relied upon by the Feres Court was not "wholly novel" but
rather, found "ready context within the framework of Workmen's Com-
pensation statutes. ' United States v. Lee, No. 21,706 (9th Cir. Aug. 30,
1968) at 7. The analogy of military benefits and the Court's recognition
that "most states have abolished the common-law action for damages be-
tween employer and employee and have superceded it with workmen's
compensation statutes which provide, in most instances, the sole basis of
liability" are clear evidence that the Court contemplated a definition of
"incident to service" in terms of the workmen's compensation statutes "course
of employment."
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Fearful of the "dire consequences" resulting from allowable
claims arising out of "[a] battle commander's poor judgment, an
army surgeon's slip of hand, or a defective jeep which causes
injury," 71 the Court has felt necessitated to reach this result.
The "dire consequences" it has foreseen in allowing recovery for
service-incident injuries are a myriad of claims and the attendant
evil-"devastation of military discipline and morale." 72
However, this spectre may be more imagined than real. The
fear of extensive litigation and its detrimental effect upon discipline
and morale might conceivably be justified if the serviceman's action
were against the individual officer or fellow soldier responsible for
his injury. The imposition of liability being on the Government,
however, seems too remote from the individual relationship to
cause any extensive subversion of discipline and morale. Indeed,
there may be no relationship at all existing between the claimant
and the alleged tort feasor and yet, relief will be precluded under
the "incident to service" rule.78
Furthermore, the existence of a comprehensive system of statu-
tory benefits would seem to minimize the danger of a multitude of
suits. The volume of potential litigation would be limited by the
probability that many injured soldiers would find little advantage in
resorting to the courts, with their attendant costs and attorney's
fees, to supplement their already "generous" benefits, as construed
by the Feres Court, under the various compensation laws. Regard-
ing frivolous or tenuous claims, it is also improbable, assuming a
judicially imposed election of remedies, that a claimant would risk
a possible denial of recovery in a law suit, where an adequate
system of compensation is available. The Act also provides that
all claims for less than $2500 may be settled by the head of the
agency affected.7 4 It is likely, therefore, that most claims would be
in this latter category since an injured serviceman incurs no med-
ical expenses nor suffers any loss of wages-two large elements of
recovery in any tort action.
In addition to the nature of military "negligence," " the re-
duced amount recoverable in view of the compensation statutes,
and the provisions within the Act providing for administrative
71Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 52 (1949).
72Brooks v. United States, 169 F.2d 840, 845 (4th Cir. 1948).
7SSee, e.g., Callaway v. Garber, 289 F.2d 171 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 874 (1961).
7428 U.S.C. §2672 (1964).
7 Negligence is a relative concept and whether an act can be so
characterized is dependent upon a balancing of interests, i.e., whether the
social desfreability of the objective sought is greater than the seriousness
of the risk created. Therefore, national defense or the prosecution of a
war would justify conduct which, absent such circumstances, would be
clearly negligent.
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determination of claims, there are several express exceptions to
the FTCA which prohibit suits by military personnel. These are
directly intended to cover those situations which present a real
danger to military discipline and morale. Thus, section 2680(j)
prohibits any claim arising in a foreign country, and section 2680(k)
precludes claims arising out of the combatant activities of the
armed forces during time of war. Another express exception
which may be applicable in limiting particularly undesirable claims
is the statutory prohibition of suits arising out of abuse of discre-
tion by a government official.70  As it is obvious that a degree of
discretion is present in almost every echelon of command in the
armed forces, this exception should allay the fear of an officer's
tactical error being made the subject of a lawsuit against the
Government.
7 7
The criterion adopted has generally produced more dust than
light. While the exclusion of servicemen injured "incident to
service" is designed to avoid interference with military discipline
and morale, the Supreme Court has never expressly indicated that
Feres should be limited to those situations which present a
direct threat of interference with military discipline. The result
has been the mechanical invocation and rigorous application of the
exclusionary rule by the federal judiciary.
Relative to governmental liability for the activities of the
military, courts have been reluctant to extend by interpretation
instances wherein the Government would be liable to private parties
for the negligence of the armed forces.78 Conversely, however, the
7623 U.S.C. §2680(a) (1964).
77 The Court's continued reluctance to allow recovery for service-
incident injuries is attributable, in part, to the fear of additional relief
available pursuant to the military compensation laws. In view of the
Brooks approach, .supra note 31 and accompanying text, the problem seems
readily resolvable. Servicemen should be accorded full recovery less bene-
fits received. Thus, all benefits previously recovered could be applied in
mitigation of damages. Alternately, some commentators have argued for
a judicially imposed election of remedies. See, e.g., Comment, Federal Tort
Claims Act as Applied to Military Personnel, 40 Ky. L.J. 438, 442-43
(1952). The Court's unequivocal refusal to adopt the latter alternative,
however, renders such an approach unlikely. See United States v. Brown, 348
U.S. 110, 113 (1954); United States v. Brooks, 337 U.S. 49, 51 (1949).
7S Indeed, the lower federal courts have adopted a purely mechanical
approach in dealing with military claims under the FTCA. The judicial
test of "injuries sustained incident to service" has degenerated into a mere
inquiry as to the location of the claimant when injury was sustained. Sim-
ilarly, Preferred Ins. Co. v. United States, 222 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1955),
involved an action to recover for property damage sustained when an
Air Force plane crashed into the trailers for enlisted men and officers loca-
ted on the base. In denying recovery, the court held that the Feres rule
barred the suit since "the damage to the trailers of the servicemen arose out
of and was in the course of activity incident to their military service."
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courts have shown no such restraint in the amorphous area of
injuries sustained "incident to service."
In considering the Feres "incident to service" rule, judicial
investigation has been limited to a case by case determination of
whether the claimant's injury is encompassed within this exclu-
sion.73  This has not proven an easy task.79  Difficulty in applica-
tion has rendered the rule generally unworkable in uncontemplated
situations. Thus in Callaway v. Garber,s0 the court recognizing the
facts to be of an isolated nature, beyond the contemplation of the
Court in Feres, nevertheless denied recovery. Through the retro-
spective interpretation of Brown, the court held that the Feres
rationale had no present application as the injured parties were
members of different branches of the service and were engaged in
entirely unrelated activity at the time of the accident. Recognizing,
however, that the case fell within the, rule of Feres, as promulgated,
the court adhered to that rule as it had in no way been subsequently
abandoned or modified.
The Feres rule, therefore, has proved conducive to factually
inconsistent results thus generating general confusion among the
See, e.g., Chambers v. United States, 357 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1966). Relief
under the Act was denied to an airman killed while swimming at a pool
on an Air Force base as the result of alleged negligence in the mainten-
ance of the pool. But see Brown v. United States, 99 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.
W. Va. 1951). Zoula v. United States, 217 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1954) held
that Feres barred a FTCA suit to recover for injuries by military stu-
dents who, while touring an Army base, were struck by an Army ambu-
lance. The fact that they were not "injured as a result of, or while acting
under, immediate and direct military orders" was held irrelevant See
also Archer v. United States, 217 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 953 (1955), wherein parents of a West Point Cadet killed when a
military transport in which he was riding gratis crashed while returning from
leave, were denied recovery. The court of appeals held that a cadet riding
under military discipline on an army plan& under the control of a superior
officer has no claim under the FTCA "for injury sustained through what-
ever cause." Id. at 551.
79Unaware of the policy considerations underlying the Feres rule, the
lower federal courts have failed to perceive the complementary nature of
the Supreme Court decisions. Accordingly, courts have variously held:
(1) that Feres is controlling and thus Brooks should be limited to its
facts; (2) Feres and Brooks are factually distinguishable thus conceptually
consistent; (3) Brooks and Brown represent limited exceptions to the
general rule of Feres; or (4) Feres is best explained by the "retrospective
interpretation" of Brown.
The lower federal courts have failed to see Feres in its overall per-
spective. The result has been that the courts have alternately emphasized
various facets of Feres. For a more detailed discussion of these anomalies
see Comment, Sovereign Inmunity-Federal Tort Claims Act-Inuries to
Armed Services Personnel, 18 W. REs. L. REv. 1788, 1794-95 (1967).
80289 F.2d 171 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 874 (1961). Decedent,
an Air Force officer, en route to a training school by private automobile,
was killed as a result of a collision on a public highway with a vehicle
negligently driven by a Navy officer.
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lower courts. A recent example is the federal district court hold-
ing in Lee v. United States."" Allowing recovery for service-
incident injuries, the Lee court reasoned that the Supreme Court,
by a series of recent decisions apposite to the Feres rationale, had
vitiated the grounds for that decision. Tracing Supreme Court
developments from Brown through Indian Towing, Rayonier and
M11uniz, the district court declared its own rule of recovery."2 It
concluded that servicemen would not be precluded from recovery
under the FTCA when the official activities of the negligent party
and those of the injured party are entirely unrelated. Accordingly,
exclusion would depend upon whether the injuries stemmed from
activities involving an official military relationship between the tort-
feasor and the claimant. If so, claimant would be precluded;
otherwise, he would not. Implicit in this conclusion is an agree-
ment with the view expressed in Brown that the underlying con-
siderations of the "incident to service" rule are the problems of
discipline and morale . 3  Pursuant to this rule of recovery, the
exclusion of military personnel is not dependent upon the status
of the individual, i.e., whether he was on active duty or leave at
the time of injury. Instead, the controlling factor would be
whether the injuries arose from activities which "involved an
official military relationship" between the claimant and the negli-
gent party. In view of its retrospective interpretation by Brown,
this isolated proposition of law would seem to be the thrust of
Feres.8 Failing to perceive this, however, the Lee court reached
this result by mistakenly relying upon Muniz as an abandonment
of the Feres rationale.8 5 Indeed, qualification and not abandonment
is the purpose served by Muniz with the ultimate effect on disci-
pline and morale as the prime consideration.
81261 F. Supp. 252 (C.D. Colo. 1966). Two Marines while on active
duty and in transit to Viet-Nam were killed when their plane, operated
by the Military Air Transport Service (MATS), United States Air Force,
crashed upon take-off. Their claimants made no charge against either the
Marine Corps or the Air Force, but alleged negligence on the part of the
Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) in operating, maintaining and controlling
the departure of the aircraft from the ground and in giving inadequate
terrain clearance information. Inasmuch as the FAA is in no way con-
trolled by either the Department of Defense, or any military department
therein, the complainant contended that the Agency's acts or omissions
were completely disassociated from the status of the decedents.
8-Id. at 256.
83348 U.S. 110 (1954).
S4See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. at 142, wherein the Court
implies such a relationship as a prerequisite to denial of relief:
It is true that if we consider relevant only a part of the circum-
stances and ignore the status of both the wronged and wrongdoer
we find . . . liability. Id.
ss Demko v. United States, 385 U.S. 149 (1966), illuminates the inap-
plicability of Muniz.
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The Lee court while denying the exclusivity of status as to
the claimant found it of controlling importance as to the tort-
feasor. In view of the judicial history of the FTCA such an
approach seems unwarranted.8 6  Status, in such circumstances,
would seem relevant only insofar as it relates to the nature of the
injurious activities. Thus, where the injury is sustained "incident
to service," only the relationship between claimant and torifeasor
would be of any significance. The fact that the tortfeasor is not
a member of the armed forces is, under such circumstances, wholly
extraneous.8 7  Further, it should be noted that the claimants'
decedents were acting pursuant to military orders. Thus, assuming
the validity of the court's criterion, the claims in issue did arise
from activities involving an official military relationship between
the negligent person and the claimant. As the appellate court
recognized, the threat to military discipline was far less direct in
Feres. The Brown rationale would necessitate an identical conclu-
sion as "[t]he considerations of discipline which in part underlie
the rule of Fetes are strikingly present here." Therefore, while it
is true that the tortfeasors were not in the armed forces, they were
engaged in activities which by their very nature were indistinguish-
able therefrom. Strictly construing the concept of "official military
relationship" the Lee court, in effect, limited exclusion from relief
under the Act to those situations which were in form, rather than
fact, of a military nature.
The difficulty of interpreting Fetes is highlighted by the fact
that, on appeal, Lee was reversed and the claims of the servicemen
s6In United Airlines Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964), the appellate court held the Government not
liable under FTCA for injuries to servicemen which arose out of activities
"incident to service," despite the fact that the Governments liability was
predicated, in part, upon negligence of employees of a separate governmental
agency. See also Sheppard v. United States, 369 F.2d 272 (3rd Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 982 (1967); Layne v. United States, 295 F.
2d 433 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 990 (1962).
8 1n this context note the following statement by the court in Law-
rence v. United States:
[Ilt is running a good principle into the ground to declare in terms
of a categorical imperative that a federal prisoner, by virtue of his
status alone, may not sue the United States tnder the provisions of
the Federal Tort Claims Act where his claim is based upon the
alleged negligence of a federal employee completely disassociated from
his status. 193 F. Supp. 243, 245 (N.D. Ala. 1961).
Such a contention is wholly consistent with the above quoted Feres state-
ment relating to the status of the wronged and wrongdoer. The consis-
tency, in view of the Brown rationale, gives rise to a strong presumption
that the status of the claimant at the time of injury is, of itself, not the
controlling factor.
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denied.88 Even in a particular fact pattern, therefore, courts are
at odds on if and how the Feres rule should be applied.
CONCLUSION: "[T]is THE SoLDiER's LIFE TO HAVE His BALMY
SLUMBERS WAIcnu WITH STRIFE." (Shakespeare: Othello II. i.i.i.)
Unfortunately, the traditional position of the soldier under law
has intensified this plight. Because of its very nature and purpose,
the military must place great emphasis upon discipline and efficiency
-often at the expense of justice. There is no need, however, that
this reliance upon disciplinary considerations be inordinate. Thus,
while the "incident to service" rule has been criticized, inter alia,
as vague and meaningless, conducive to factually inconsistent results,
its greatest evil subsists in its pervasive scope and indiscriminate
application. Lacking the guidance of any explicit statement of
congressional intent, the Supreme Court, fearful of the adverse
effect of certain claims upon military discipline and morale, formu-
lated a rule of recovery predicated upon policy considerations of
questionable validity. Unconvinced by its own reasoning, the
Court has discreetly abandoned these grounds, expressly adopting
the position that adverse effects on morale and discipline should
control. Rather than an abandonment, this represents a refine-
ment of the Feres rationale.
In view of the present confusion abounding among the lower
federal courts, it is submitted that the "incident to service" rule
has proven inadequately reflective of the Feres doctrine. It would
seem that a rational extension, of this rule to those situations more
intimately related to the "peculiarly military aspects" of the soldier's
life would accomplish the desired result. Pursuant to the benevo-
lent purpose of the Act, restrictions should be imposed reluctantly"9
only when clearly warranted by the most urgent policy-consider-
ations. Considering the conscriptive nature of the modem military
8The district court's holding in Lee is also contrary to the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Layne v. United States, 295 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 990 (1962). In Layne, the widow of an Air Na-
tional Guardsman sought recovery under the FTCA for the deceased's
death on a training flight, allegedly caused by the negligence of civilian
employees of the government. The claimant specifically contended that
the suit was not precluded by Feres because the alleged negligence was that
of civilian employees rather than of military personnel. The court found
this argument to be "lacklng in merit," and dismissed the suit on the
ground that death had occurred as "an incident to military service." Id.
at 436.89 See in this context Judge Cardozo's opinion in Anderson v. John L.
Hayes Constr. Co., 243 N.Y. 140, 147, 153 N.E. 28, 29-30 (1926).
The exemption of the sovereign from suit involves hardship enough,
where consent has been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by
refinement of construction, where consent has been announced.
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complex, servicemen should not be discriminatorily treated. Nor
should the generally progressive movement away from the out-
moded concept of sovereign immunity be impeded by imagined
fears. As both Feres and Lee have demonstrated: "One struggles
in vain for any verbal formula that will supply a ready touch-
stone. . . . Life in all its fullness must supply the answer to the
riddle." 90 Thus, in formulating a rule of recovery, courts, motiv-
ated by justice in the particular case, should gaze intently upon
the policy-sought to be effected.
90Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).
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